As a step toward redressing conflicts among ethnic minorities and state majorities, this study compares the Moros Muslims of the southern Philippines with the Kurds of Turkey. This paper examines mechanisms to ameliorate violence perpetrated by separatists and by states. Such alternatives would improve the living standards of those socially, economically, and politically disadvantaged by their minority status. While accepting that the current stratification seems intractable, this paper suggests that improved ethnic-state relations would result from leadership characterized by integrity rather than by corruption, governance modeled on a consociational system in the Philippines and an integrative system in the Turkey, economic and educational development, and civic institutions.

Introduction:

Ethnic violence in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century has resulted in genocides, razing of villages, disappearances, displacement, and militarization of homelands. Often both the state and the ethnic group perpetrate the violence. To the minority affected by a disparity in economic and social conditions apparently based on their ethnicity or religion, they have seemingly no recourse but violence against the government. To the state, the maintenance of security, order, and national integrity depends on suppression of "the guerrillas." Yet, violence breeds more violence. Long periods of impoverishment, unemployment, and debasement of identity remove hope for a better life. However, rather than a government alleviating the suffering, it sometimes increases the resentment and anger by its policies of assimilation, suppression, cruelty, torture, and militarism. A comparative study of two cases-the Muslims in the southern Philippines and the Kurds in Turkey-offers a partial answer to the question, "What policies would decrease the violence and increase the standard of living for the ethnic minority?"

The similarities in the cases provide rich comparative analysis, but the distinctions yield nuanced conditions that require carefully considered policies. Both the Kurds and the Moros are indigenous people asking for self-determination because of social, political, cultural, and economical deprivation. Both have high illiteracy rates. In fact, the Philippines have the highest literacy rate among the Asians countries, but by contrast the Muslims in the southern region have the highest illiteracy rate in the Philippines. The Kurds also have the highest illiteracy rate in Turkey, especially among the Kurdish women. Both cultures maintain the social pressure on women to marry early and to submit to a forced or arranged marriage as well as continue the tradition of bride money extended for the exchange of a wife between families. For both Kurds and Moros the couples face the threat of violence against women if they transgress the limits on sexual behavior as imposed by tradition. Customs and religious practices support some of these control mechanisms. Problems resulting from regional differences in socio- economic conditions seriously affect women of both minorities. Socio-economic conditions for both women and men progressively worsen as an observer moves from west to east in Turkey and from the heavily populated Catholic areas to the Muslim populated areas in the Philippines.

Terrain affects both minorities. Commonly repeated, the Kurds have no friends but the mountains and often retreat into them for protection and for operations. Likewise, the Muslims have good friends in the jungle. With a history of being an indigenous ethnic group dominated by a nation state, both balance a past and a distinctive culture rooted in their own identity that led to conflict, particularly in the early 1970s. Marxist ideology and nationalism drives both. In the 1980s, however, the Philippines' minority was fueled by those who studied in Middle Eastern countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt and who returned with a fundamentalism intensifying the violence. The tribes and tribal confederations provide both Muslims and Kurds an organizational structure with chiefs (datu), sultans, or ustad-those who study Islam abroad-among the Filipinos and agha and shaik among the Kurds. For the state, in Turkey and in the Philippines, nationalism has led to policies of assimilation and integration that brought about martial law when the minorities resisted. Also, in both cases the government has imposed policies of civilian displacement.

Review of Literature

A review of the literature shows that no comparative study between the ethno nationalist groups of the Moros in the southern Philippines and the Kurds in southeastern Turkey exists. Filling this lacuna in the research may provide valuable insights into the causes of social, political, and economic deprivation that results in resistance, secession movements, or terrorism as well as the state's responses to ensure the safety of the citizenry and the integration of its borders. Current literature on civil conflict and civil wars notes chiefly the social variables of ethnic, religious, and linguistic fragmentation. For example, in Why Men Rebel, Ted Gurr's seminal research on deprivation theory argues that relative deprivation leads to aggression dependent on "an actor's perception of the discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities" (1970, p. 24). J.C. Davies studied the frustration-aggression mechanism to connect deprivation to violence but also noted a reversal in gratification, so that deprivation can lead to nonaggression and even to cooperation (1973, p. 248). R.J. Rummel devised a conflict helix to explain an adjustment based on perception. Describing injustice vectors-the moral sense of deprivation relative to others, Rummel extends Gurr's explanation of the link between subjective wants and perceived justice versus perceived capabilities. Rummel argues that the situation involves the balance of power an individual perceives between himself and others theorizing about what happens after manifest conflict or violence (1977, 3.1). He concludes that if one group acts, such as through government coercion, forcing its definition of social justice on another, a balance in interests, capabilities, and wills may settle the conflict. Chaim Kaufmann contends that even the will of the international community cannot solve ethnic conflicts by aid or by sanctions but that "the costs of military intervention in ethnic wars are lower, the feasibility higher, and the alternatives fewer" (1996, p. 175). In his view, humanitarian aid proves helpful only if the world community recognizes that some ethnic wars can be solved only by more drastic means such as population transfers, separation, or partitioning, but at minimum the defensible security of the ethnic people (Kaufmann, p. 175). Jonathan Fox broadens the perspectives on ethnic conflict by questioning Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations theory from the points of view of the West and Islam, using states with internal conflict between the minority and the majority (2003, p. 283). Fox concludes that separatism, and by proxy nationalism, best explains identity for ethnic minorities' rebellion (p. 293). Jay Rothman and Marie Olson examine the salience of identity on intractable civil conflict, noting that deeply rooted, protracted social conflict makes moving from brutal conflict to settlement difficult under interest based and resource based approaches (2001, p. 289). More recent studies note that rebels seizing power may operate from greed, opportunism, as well as differences in the nature of Islamist politics in the region and social and political alienation. Contrasting minority conflicts that resulted in settlements with those that led to genocide and/or long-term oppression suggests that particularly the indicators of a strong civic participation and a sense ownership of democratic processes increase settlements (Wright-Neville 2004, p. 43).

Focusing on ethnic strife, Gevork Ter-Gabrielian from the Center for World Indigenous Studies categorizes the four players: the state, ethnic groups, intergovernmental organizations that divide functions and powers among the indigenous groups, and non-governmental actors (1999, p. 1). The state and intergovernmental organizations may respond to ethnic conflict by strategies of confrontation, such as removal, or by strategies of accommodation, such as setting up a federation or consociation, for power sharing among the state government and the minority separatists, such as the Moros and the Kurds. The ethnic groups may comply or resist the expectations of the state. Compliance on the part of the ethnic group and accommodation by the state, particularly using non-governmental actors and intergovernmental agencies, may reduce the chance of escalation. Ter-Gabrielian argues that ethnic conflict results from "the inability and inflexibility of nation states' framework in guaranteeing a fair distribution of power and rights among all the significant groups' actors and the state" (1999, p. 4). Instead, mechanisms that preclude escalation must be implemented incrementally, and transparency must characterize the government. In his view, two-track diplomacy, preventative diplomacy, peace-building strategies, and effective use of non-governmental organizations may give recognition to ethnic groups' sovereignty in regard to their culture, history, territory, education, and the like, while not posing threats to the state in the form of rebellion, secession, or independence. Looking at Mindanao, Patricio Abinales addresses the Philippines' state making from the complexity of ideology, ethnicity, warlordism, world war, foreign occupancy but argues that the conflict between central and regional power-particularly through powerful leaders and strong men-- affected the outcome of the political landscape (2000).

Methodology

Gleaning from a review of literature on minority conflicts, this study uses exclusive interviews with government officials, academics, members of the separatist groups, as well as historical records, databanks, and field-based research in the southern Philippines in conjunction with ethnographic studies of the Kurds in southeastern Turkey for comparative analysis to find alternatives to violence. This study qualitatively examines the dependent variable of the status of the Moros and of the Kurds and the independent variables of (1) integrity of leadership, (2) government and accountability, (3) economic and educational development, and (4) civil society and institutions such as non-governmental organizations for the purposes of determining alternatives to violence by and against the minorities. The dichotomy of the two groups studied incorporates arguments from the marginalized perspective and from the nationalist perspective. This cross-country research considers a confluence of factors that contributes to violence, factors that must be addressed to provide alternatives.

Hypothesis:

By establishing leadership with integrity, an accountable and transparent government, economic and educational development, and a civil society with non-governmental institutions and other civic associations, the states of the Philippines and Turkey could improve the social and economic status of the Moros and Kurds, respectively, and thereby reduce the violence perpetrated by both actors.

Background of Two Cases

This study examines the proposed mechanisms and tests the hypothesis using two cases of Muslims--those in the southern Philippines and the Kurds in Turkey. The juxtaposition of minorities in the Philippines with those in Turkey utilizes the similarities and differences of systems design (see Appendix A) to determine alternatives to violence. Both states obtained independence after the world wars. Both have adopted democratic systems. Both countries approached their minority issues with strong military solutions rather than with democratic solutions. Military officers in both countries have ruled the same periods in the early 70's and 80's under strong centralized governments. The Muslims in the Philippines believe that the root of ethnic conflict in the Philippines goes back to Spanish colonialism. The Kurds date their suppression to the presidency of Kemal Atatürk, who founded the Republic of Turkey in 1923. Curiously, both the Moros and the Kurds in Turkey (under the Kurdistan Workers' Party, the PKK) started rebellions against the government early in the 70's, and both were driven by socialist ideas. Both claimed to be indigenous people and demanded greater autonomy. The Philippines with a majority of Roman Catholics and a minority of Muslims contrasts to Turkey with a majority of Sunni Muslims, the same religious orientation as the Kurds. The Moros emigrated from the Malay racial stock as other Filipinos and are distinguished by cultural and religious rather than by physical differences. Not being from the same racial stock as Turks, the Kurds, however, are ethnically and thus physically, as well as culturally and socially differentiated from the Turks. Muslims in the Philippines constitute 10 to 20 % (according to the Muslims) or 5% (according to the CIA Factbook) of Philippines‘s population, and the Kurds constitute 20 % of Turkey's population.. Also, in the case of the Philippines, their neighboring countries are mostly Muslims and therefore unified in their antagonism toward those seemingly treating their brothers differently. As Alain-Gerard Marsot points out, an Islamic resurgence in Asia has had political consequences with the severity of the results depending on geography, historical background, relative size of the Muslim community, and government policy (1992, p. 157). Islam became a political force in the intertwining of religious and political questions. The adoption of the Arabic language of the conquering Muslims and of the Qur'an, the "fusion of spiritual and temporal powers in the caliphate," the leadership system from the Turks of Central Asia, and the subsequent syncretism of pre-existing beliefs and customs brought about the current Muslim dominance in the Malay world. Like the Muslims in Thailand, those in the Philippines constitute a minority and are concentrated in a particular geographic area. Marsot posits, "Policies of either benign neglect or semi-forced assimilation have radicalized the Muslims' resistance, leading to insurgency, often supported from outside" and have been radicalized by their affinities with the more political Malaysia (Marsot, p. 169). The political fundamentalist Islam resurgence has spearheaded a "cultural dewesternization" (Marsot, p. 169). In the case of the Kurds, the Kurds are divided among neighboring countries and, as Kurds, share the same policy about Kurdish issues, particularly in their desire for autonomy. By contrast to the Philippines, the strong nations neighboring Turkey, although also Muslim, play the strategic Kurdish card to retain their power in the region.

The two case studies differ in the willingness of each state to negotiate. Proving more receptive to the Moros, the Philippines' government negotiated with the Muslim rebels and in 1989 gave them an autonomous region to run their internal affairs. The Philippines has proved much more receptive to the Moros and, as a consequence, they have achieved an autonomous region. During President V. Ramos' administration, the government of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Army (MNLF) signed a peace pact and as a result, the government granted an autonomous region for Muslim minorities in the southern Philippines, known as the Muslim Autonomous Region (ARM). By contrast, the Turks consistently denied the Kurds their identity, referring to them as "Mountain Turks." Consequently, the state never directly negotiated with the Kurdish rebels known as Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). For the Turkish government, until the presidential administration of the Turgut Özal in the late and 1980's and early 1990's, the Kurds simply did not exist as a distinct ethnic and linguistic population within the state. Özal opened the door slightly for possible negotiations with Kurdish representatives but also he gave the Turkish military more power to take offensive action in the Kurdish provinces. In addition, he continued to maintain his predecessor's opinion of the PKK as a terrorist organization.

The two states have made different attempts to make peace with the separatists with different outcomes for the Moros and the Kurds. In the Philippines after countless violations of the agreement by both the government and of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) forces in July 1997, the Philippine government and the MILF peace talks started to tackle the issues in October 1999. Responding to breaches of the cease fire agreement, President Joseph Estrada declared an all out war against the MILF in March 2000. A few days later in the wake of the capture of the MILF's main camp, the leader of the group called a jihad against the Manila government. By comparison, the Turkish government has brushed aside the PKK's offers of a peace, and the government's responsibility for lack of negotiations is on public record. Initially, the PKK's public statement and policies early in 1992 attempted to establish an autonomous, independent Kurdistan. Later, however, even the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan made an announcement that he was not demanding an independent Kurdish state, but rather broader recognition of Kurdish people. Nevertheless, the Turkish government never agreed to sit in negotiations with any organization intended to establish an independent state or semi independent state within Turkey.

The Philippines experienced the Spanish and American colonialism in her pre and post world wars' political history, before becoming a democracy. In addition, Filipinos suffered from the Japanese occupation from 1941-1945, and lost over a million lives before being liberated by the Americans under General MacArthur in September of 1945 with Americans losing 60,628 men. The Republic was founded on the fourth of July 1946. On the other hand, Turkey initially experienced a democratic development, directed and heavily influenced by the military, democratization, economic development, institutions, and urbanization-all leading to the weakening of tribal systems in the Kurdish regions, described below, and thereby giving opportunities to challenge the existing tribal leaders. In regard to leadership, the Kurdish political leaders became radicalized after 1980 when they did not receive fair treatment from the government or could not find political representation in the government. In the Philippines, the patronage was distributed through religious administrative structures. This study tries to utilize the most similar systems design to identify variables that explain the overall level of disparity for minorities between those two countries. However, because of the contrasts, a one-to-one comparison of the two countries cannot be strictly followed. My theory suggests that providing patronage goods for the disadvantaged will not prevent potential ethnic conflict and will not resolve existing problems. Rather, the state must adopt institutional reforms to ensure a balanced distribution within an ethnic minority and a participatory government with proportional representation in the state. Leaders with integrity, transparent and accountable government, economic and educational development, and functional civil institutions -- goals desired for many developing countries-- will yield a desirable outcome.

The Integrity of Leadership

While a shift has occurred in the conceptual definition from seeing that kinship, guild, caste, church, and family in the past have provided the main sources of association and authority (Dion, 1968: 2), today's leaders emerge in giant corporations, non-governmental organizations, and communications industries. Studies show that leadership results from personal characteristics (Schoenfeld 1948, p. 391), field structure or environment (Cox 1974, p. 141), positions of power (Kezar 2000, p. 722), functional behavior (Lord 1977, p.144), and leadership style (Shea 1999, p. 407). Dion found that "mutual understanding and acceptance create a climate which permits the replacement of external coercion by internal persuasion as a motivation for conforming to the leaders' expectations" (Dion, 1969:16). Leaders who engage in participatory, two-way exchanges showing responsiveness and a willingness to listen and who demonstrate a self-efficacy play an important mediating role in the relationship between leadership and performance. In a recent lecture at a Texas university, General Tommy Franks explained that an effective leader surrounds himself with intelligent advisors, listens to opposing views, and makes decisions based on the collective wisdom of the wise consultants and his own experience (2005). This type of leadership required in the complexity of the modern world contrasts greatly with the system of leadership under a configuration of tribes-the historical and residual style of leadership of both the Moros and the Kurds. The system of residual tribalism retains a leadership style that lends itself to assuming complete allegiance and to enflaming violence.

Tribalism

Contrasting to globalism and to nationalism, tribalism--the initial social system in human history--divides groups into small roughly independent subgroups, usually by locality and often follows a patrilineal system. This social system often lacks any organizational level beyond that of the local tribe, has a relatively well-bounded group, and usually gives authority to a chief, shiek, (or sheikh), who rules sometimes by coercion, though it is often minimal (Evans-Pritchard 1940). The role of tribalism from a political standpoint is very crucial for the Muslims in Mindanao because of the indigenous peoples' struggle for self-determination and for recognition as a distinct nation that can effectively participate in the current discourse on political options for Mindanao. However, they need to revisit their own form of political leadership and governance, consolidate it within and among the different tribes, and subsequently propose a more unified and clearer political option for them in the mainstream governance. Muslims come together only when there is a common enemy, but otherwise it is hard to unify them. To unify with the nation, they need strong institutions of law, that which has held America together for almost three centuries despite so many ethnicities and nationalities. Not all Americans share the same belief, philosophy or ideologies, but the political structure that underpins America is its unique constitution based on the framers' suspicions. The founders believed that since human beings are not perfect, they are therefore capable of abuse of power and need checks to curb that power. In both Moroland and Turkey, the factions caused by tribalism compound the conflicts. Internal fighting within Islam pits the traditionalists (those who believe everything should be interpreted according to the Qur'anic text) and modernists (those who consider the time period and blend the twenty-first century with the sixth century). Within the Kurdish and the Muslim cultures, the group takes precedence over the individual with loyalty to the group becoming a powerful obligation. Bonds between friends, neighbors, and distant cousins can develop ties as strong as those between close family members. These social relationships sometimes deny, fabricate, and manipulate kinship. Because of this tribalism, the Kurds and Moros have survived as individuals as well as retained their sense of identity as people, and often have resorted to violence as a result of their independence, but sometimes to their detriment. In Turkey, with the uprising of the Kurdish revolt of the 1920's through 1930's, Ankara largely succeeded in exterminating the Kurdish tribes, except in the most remote reaches of the country. By the military forcing the tribal leaders to relocate or by executing them, the detribalization of Turkish Kurdistan was initiated. The policy also affected the state's economic and bureaucratic modernization, although other Kurdish people remain largely tribal. By contrast, the Philippines remain more primitive like their ancestors and have only the precursory of modern polities. The Manila government did not detribalize the Muslim Moros.

In Muslim and Kurdish societies, every tribe has a chief or ruling class of the most powerful and respected family in the tribe. Traditionally Kurdish agha rule through a combination of deference, power, and custom. The reputation of the agha relies on knowledge, wisdom or courage, and the command of their tribesmen. Their activities depend on the kind of economic activity or administrative duties they undertake, such as maintaining systems or irrigations, running smugglers' operation, or conducting raids against others tribes, state forces, or trading caravans because the agha has enormous political and economic power. He owns all the land and villages, and the people work for him. The agha settles disputes and can extend the death penalty as well. His subjects consider the tribal chief's ruling right and just, and no subordinate refute his ideas or opinion. If someone comes as a guest to the village, the agha will keep the guest in his guest house, providing food and shelter during the night until the traveler continues on his journey the next day. In Turkey many agha or tribal leaders assume the role of politicians and administrators. Most of them will help only their relatives or kinship. Also, they generally will be corrupt, getting richer and manipulating uneducated people. By not encouraging the young to go to school and not opening their tribe to the new world, they hope not to lose control of them However, generations have changed, and most of the young Kurds go to school and have a desire to become educated, resulting in the agha's gradual loss of credibility and control.

Sheiks were either members of the Naqshabandi or Qadiri. The dervish is an Islamic mystical or Sufi brotherhood with similarities to the Catholic monastic orders. With their ecstatic communion with God and their segregation of themselves from human society, the dervish gained a reputation for wisdom and holiness. As they attracted disciples and followers as well as took on power, they claimed that they descended from of the prophet Muhammad and therefore could also play the role of mullah. This cultural heritage underpins the leadership for the Kurds, albeit only as an echo of the past. Tribalism through the agha and sheiks, even in the residual form, lends itself to group mentality and absolute allegiance to the cause they deem appropriate.

Corruption

The effectiveness and efficiency of the leaders depend on their freedom from corruption because such practices as procurement of earmarked funds, misappropriations, mismanagement of loans, fraud, graft, granting contracts to cronies, and even embezzlement of government monies siphon off the public resources that leaders with integrity could have used to reduce poverty, provide education, and build infrastructure. Corruption is like a disease in the Philippines. From its independence until the 1990's, bureaucratic corruption has permeated the entire Philippine bureaucracy. An extensive network of corruption operates from the lower levels of the organizational hierarchy, to the mid-level officials misusing their positions, and to the elite engaged in corrupt transactions, but whose positions and powerful connections render them almost immune from the legal authorities (Alfiler 1979, p. 347). In 2000, President Joseph Estrada was impeached for bribery, corruption, betraying public trust, and violating the constitution. Today the husband of the current president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has been charged with corruption and cheating as well.

Not only are the government and local officials corrupt, but also some Muslim leaders or imams. These leaders, and their relatives, are often rich while their followers are poor. Sadly, corruption becomes part of the younger generation's education and, like a virus, damages and endangers the country's social, economic and political life, particularly if their imams and spiritual leaders siphon off funds. If children come to believe that personal effort and merit do not count and that success comes though manipulation, favoritism, and bribery, then the very foundation of society is shaken. In addition, the consequences of corruption are particularly harsh for the poor, who have no way to escape from extreme poverty, and for the children, who have no access to education and no alternatives but a low quality of education-the madrasah schools.

The Berlin-based Transparency International defines corruption as the "abuse of public office for private gain" (Transparency International 2004). The term "transparency" refers to the concept that all information concerning the state revenues and spending as well as income of politicians and their financial situation must be open to the citizenry in the state (Transparency International 2004). However, in the sensitive spending areas of defense or security, a parliamentary commission may oversee the expenditures. Likewise, the state should make public all the sources or revenues, its expenses, and the account managers. The following chart shows the transparence index, that is the perception of corruption, in Turkey and in the Philippines.

Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index 2004

Table 14: National institutions and sectors - corrupt or clean: To what extend do you perceive the following the sectors in this / territory to be affected by corruption?

(1: not at all corrupt, 5: extremely corrupt)

Country - Political Parties - Parliamentary or Legislature - Legal Systems Judiciary - Police - Military

Turkey - 4.0 - 3.8 - 3.9 - 4.0 - 3.1

Philippines - 4.1 - 4.1 - 3.6 - 4.2 -3.4 Click here

Both Turkey and the Philippines show a high level of corruption in all these areas of politics and law enforcement. For the Philippines, millions of dollars come from western donor countries under the peace negotiations, but the money ends up in the hands of some government officials and Muslim leaders. The money, unfortunately, never goes to alleviate the needs of the extremely poor with leaders seeming to get extremely rich and the poor getting extremely poor. Ahmet, a member from one of the communities I visited, told me, "I don't believe Muslims' politicians or Philippines' politicians because both of them are the same. I thought Muslims would do something for us, but they are more corrupt than Christians. The only hope we have now is the western NGOs, but even with those NGOs, the money goes to them." In the Philippines the financial issues of both administrations-the spiritual and the secular-- are their best kept secrets because no one has an idea which revenues either administration has and how they are being spent. Nor does anyone have an idea about the income of the high ranking politicians and how much they and their relatives cost society. Granted, some of them do not have an income, but many consider all the revenues of the region as their own income, from which they donate a part to the people. The financial issues in the southern Philippines' spiritual and secular administrations are both more or less strictly private family matters.

When groups become conscious of their rights and the way that injustice hurts the dignity of human beings, they will never rest, including resorting to violence, until they get those rights. The exploited will take back their natural and legitimate rights, but they must do so in a civil society, a society ruled by law and order, social justice, and equal opportunity for all citizens. The distribution of the power by an effective system of checks and balances between the different branches would control the power. Moroland needs a separation of powers in the executive, legislative and judiciary powers, where each branch acts independently from the other ones and at the same time controls each other. They could follow all civilized societies that have an independent body to control the finances of the state, one directly elected by the people or set up by the democratically elected parliament.

In the matter of corruption, it is easy for the Kurds to point a finger at the Turkish government. It is true that the Turkish government failed to embrace the Kurdish people with equal justice, but also the Kurdish leaders fall into the line of corruption as well. The Kurds did not have a leader who solely committed himself or herself to the Kurdish cause to unify all the Kurds. For example, Abdullah Ocalan was known as a true fighter of the Kurdish people, but he actually killed many Kurds for not supporting or for defying him. If Ocalan were a true Kurdish leader, he would not have allied himself with Syria, where now perhaps 1.7 million Kurds live under the Syrians' cruel Baath party regime (Blanford, 16 June 2005). It is not that the Syrian government likes the Kurds; rather, Damascus uses them as pawns to get back at Turkey for building dams on the rivers north of the Turkish-Syrian border, depriving Syria of much-needed water for irrigation and city use. In reality the Baathist government of strongman Hafez Assad is just as ruthless as that of Iraq's Saddam and of the Turkish government. But Ocalan himself was ruthless and corrupt. Recently Abdulmelik Firat, a veteran politician, was elected twice as deputy from the now defunct Democrat Party (DP) and True Path Party (DYP) to parliament. He is a grandson of Sheikh Said, who was hanged with forty-seven other Kurds in the 1925 revolt. Now Firat has established the Right Freedom Party (HAKPAR). A short time ago he gave an interview to the New Anatolian newspaper. According to Abdulmelik Firat, there is an alliance between the PKK and some secret government bodies; he alleged further that imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan is also a part of the alliance. Therefore, Firat, like many others, believe that the Turkish army could have solved the Kurdish problem, but it did not want to do so. He argues that state officials never reflected the voice of the man on the street in Turkey because the military and civilian bureaucracy has always administrated the Turkish government. Firat claims that the PKK was also created by the Turkish government. After the coup on the twelfth of September 1980, the PKK all fled from Turkey to Syria. According to Firat, all the government officials knew that. He further argues that the reason that the military did not want to solve the Kurdish question in a democratic way was because the military was involved in drug trafficking in southeastern Turkey, and also because the military who were based in that area received higher compensation than their counterparts in the west. In addition, because of the unrest, the military could rationalize their involvement in politics (Erel, 16 Nov. 2005). Firat's opinions underscore the fundamental distrust of the leaders on both sides.

A prime example of a corrupt tribal leader, the agha, becoming ricer and richer is Sedat Bucak, an agha from the southeastern city of Urfa, a member of the parliament from the True Bath Party (DYP), and a part of the Susurluk scandal. A traffic accident on the third of November 1996, outside the town of Susurluk in western Turkey led to accusations of state-mafia connections and state-sponsored assassinations. Pulling out of a gas station, a Mercedes car crashed into an oncoming truck, killing three of the four passengers (Huseyin Kocadag, a former captain in the Special Operations Unit, a government anti-terrorist unit; a man named Mehmet Özbay; and Özbay's girlfriend Gonca Us). Only Sedat Bucak survived. Özbay proved to be Abdullah Catli, a right-wing terrorist from the 1970's who had evaded Interpol since he escaped in 1982 from a Swiss prison, where he had been held on drug charges. Also, the Mercedes contained a cache of automatic weapons and silencers, many of them property of the Interior Ministry; Catli's eight valid national identity cards issued in different names; and two Turkish diplomatic passports personally signed by the True Path interior minister of the time, Mehmet Agar. The most incriminating evidence, Catli's fingerprints were found on Kalashnikov who in 1995 killed Kurdish businessman and casino operator Lütfü Topal, indicating that some government officials were involved in the Topal assassination. Agar told the parliamentary investing that he could not discuss Catli's relation to his ministry, the issuance of the identity cards and passports, or Catli's having the Interior Ministry's weapons in Bucak's Mercedes. Bucak, who had known Catli for four years prior to the accident, claimed to be the true Kurdish voice in the Turkish Parliament (Meyer, Sept. 1997, p. 359). Such scandal is indicative of the corruption among the agha in Turkey.

Government and Accountability

A characteristic of good governance, accountability requires reporting and thereby reduces the deviance of elected representatives and other office-holders from their theoretical responsibilities thereby minimizing corruption (Accountability 2005). The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) is a product of the Spanish and American colonialism. The GRP in 1987 adopted a new constitution similar to the United States Constitution, organized a representative republic, and established a democracy loosely modeled on the U.S. system. The 1987 Constitution, adopted during the Corazon Aquino's administration, reestablished a presidential system of government with a bicameral legislature and an independent judiciary. The selection of the judiciary is contrary to that of the U.S., in that in the Philippines the President elects the Supreme Court but without the provision of Congress. The President serves a term of six years and may no longer run for re-election, unless he or she becomes President through constitutional succession and has served for no more than four years as president. Currently out of the twenty-four Senators, thirteen were elected in 2001; the Senators are elected at large and may be reelected. They serve a six-year term with half being elected every three years. The House has 206 representatives. Of a possible 250 members of the House of Representative, 206 are elected from the single-member districts. The remainder of the House seats is designated for sectoral representatives elected at large through a complex "party list" system, hinging on the party receiving at least 3% to 5% of the national vote total. But in order for a bill to become a law, it has to go through both chambers. The lower chamber of the House has a Muslim representative, but the Senate does not. Consequently, a bill can be approved in the House, but cannot go through the Senate because the Muslims have no voice. When I interviewed a Muslim Congressman from Sulo, Hussin Amin, he told me that he has many bills pending because it is hard to pass them through the Senate.

The government of Turkey is a republic, at least in name and to a degree in practice. Under the 1982 Constitution, parliamentary representation is based proportionally on a party's nationwide vote, while elections for the President are separate and also based on a national vote. In addition, Turkey is a member of NATO and currently in the negotiation process for becoming a member of the European Union. Although founded as a republic, Turkey has had a rocky political history. In three coups and one soft coup since World War II--1960, 1970, and 1980, the Turkish military succeeded in taking over but failed to do so in 1997. In 1983, direct military rule gave way to civilian rule when the new parliament was elected. Özal became Prime Minister, and the coup leader Kenan Evren became president. Evren‘s appointment highlighted a fundamental problem with Turkish democracy: inordinate political power by the military. But also the military drew a new constitution claiming that "the military is the guardian of the secular state." Contrasting to the U.S. Constitution that establishes the military as the guardian of the Constitution, not of the government, the Turkish government granted power to the military. Therefore, Turkish democracy is flawed in that routine legislation is in civilian hands, but military leaders decide the course of action in Kurdistan. Until 2003, Kurdistan was under "emergency rule" with justice dispensed largely by military tribunals.

The Kurdish people did not have a representative in the Turkish parliament but did have taxation without representation. Earlier Turkey had a 5% election threshold, a clause that stipulates that a party must receive a minimum percentage of votes, either nationally or within a particular district, to get any seats in the parliament. As a Kurd elected to Parliament, Leyla Zana used the Kurdish language during the oath-taking ceremony and therefore was indicted and sent to prison for almost ten years. Now to make it more difficult for the Kurdish people to have a voice in Parliament, the government raised the threshold again to a 10 % system. The effect of the threshold is to eliminate small parties or to force them into coalitions. Many people hold that this makes an election system more stable by keeping out radical factions. Even though the Turkish electoral system is proportional, the high threshold makes it hard for the Kurdish minority to gain a seat in the Parliament.

The Kurdish and Muslim minorities' struggle against the central government of their regions are ancient and complex. For many centuries, a variety of grievances has provided rallying points for both the Kurdish and Muslim minorities' discontent and resistance against the Turkish and the Philippines' government respectively. The issues range from social, economical, cultural, and political spectrums and include demands for a high share of revenues from the reserve beneath Kurdish and Muslims' soil. In the twenty-first century some scholars would argue that the role of government is independent from class and sectoral interests, so that it should stand for the interests of the people in general rather than for the interests of the powerful minority. Also, that role includes the capacity to represent the people through strong institutions and through a strong bureaucracy to execute policy and to deliver the essential services. Yet, often faster economic development and social reform would achieve victory over the minority's poverty. The ability of state to provide basic services, to guarantee peace and order, and to encourage a faster economic development deters ethnic conflicts-and its offspring, violence--caused by the disparity between the majority and the minority, and even in some case civil war.

The question of balance in the government arises. If a centralized government is accused of authoritarianism, is it democratic? However, if the state is weak, then some faction can take advantage, so what should the government do to protect its citizens without abusing their civil rights? Also, if the state's weakness is manifested in such behaviors as uncollected taxes and uncontrolled crime, inflated bureaucracies, minimal salaries, and high emigration rates, the society will call for better governance. Yet business leaders ask for the implementation of consistent policies to develop their companies, city dwellers petition for clean water and sanitary conditions, the middle class demands professionalism and honesty, and the poor fight for the government to represent them or, in a worst case, for secession if the state fails them over a period of time. Also, the state's weaknesses are due in part to its acquiescence to sectoral interests; indeed, the rural poor demand reform for the country's productive capacity, but powerful elites oppose it; the rural poor speak out for housing, food subsistence, and basic health care, but the ruling elite , along with political tribal leaders and opportunistic politicians-often constituting a small but powerful minority-- deny these simple needs and instead use their government office as a source for booty, bribes, ill-gotten gains. Many advocates of improved conditions for the impoverished-such as the Moros and the Kurds-- argue that strong institutions would stand for the interests of all the people, not just the majority. During President Marco's martial law regime of the 1970's and 1980's, his extreme centralization of the state power caused two armed rebellions. It cost thousands of lives in repression and billions of dollars in corruption. Further, it set the nation back years in economic development and exacerbated suspicion of the state. Today the public wants law and order, but nobody trusts the police (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005, p. 2). If a representative government exists, if functional institutions are in place, and if there is no unbiased government policy against the ethnic minority, why does an economic and social disparity between the majority and ethno-nationalist minority exist? Why do minorities feel marginalized within their country? The minorities perceive that the government has failed to deliver equal services to all its citizens and instead threaten its oppressed citizens based on their minority statues. The causes of prejudice based on ethnic identity become more political salient. Recent studies, such as that of Abinales and Amoroso, show that members of a marginalized ethnic group will try to coordinate an ethnic category to form a minimum winning coalition given the electoral rules and the population distribution among the categories. As a result, the ethnic category becomes the focal point for a minimum-winning coalition and develops the main political cleavage, thereby becoming politically salient.

Militarism

Militarism conceptualizes that the military capacity provides the foundation of a society and that the development and maintenance of that society depends on its armed forces (Militarism 2005). The Kurdish people feel that they are in prison and cannot move because they are surrounded by the Turkish military with guns pointed at them. Since the 1980 coup, the Turkish military is still a major player in Turkish politics. While the majority of Turkish soldiers serve almost two-year term, the officer corps operates as a self-contained and independent force. The Turkish army sees itself as the guarantor of the Turkish nationhood. Until 2003, Kurdish provinces remained under the emergency rule or a kind of martial law, a policy granting the military freedom to do whatever it wants to do. Foreign and national journalists and media correspondents could not access the region while it was under military rule, so some soldiers raped Kurdish women, burned houses, destroyed many villages, and displaced Kurdish people. Civilians have made these charges against the Turkish military and government in the national courts and also in an international court. Yet, the military is not willing for the Turkish government to ease the restrictions on and to open up the political process for the Kurdish people. Even though president Özal partially reduced the restriction on the spoken Kurdish language, he passed an anti-terrorism bill supported by the military giving the military free hand to abuse human rights, such as the causing the disappearance of both men and women. Also, even though the European Union has pressured the Turkish government to reduce the role of the military to that of an advisory committee, the reduced status is only on paper because the Turkish military still puts great restrictions on Turkish politics. For example, the Turkish military has restricted by law that members of the Parliament enjoy legal immunity from anti-terrorist laws, but the 1994 arrest of six members from the pro- Kurdish DEP party has undermined this protection. In 1996, the soldiers, not including police and national security personnel, numbered 300,000 to 400,000 in southeastern Turkey. The PKK is a highly organized and disciplined guerrilla organization both in Turkey and abroad with a chain of command. They have both military training camps and political centers and are organized into small bands that live off the land. The villagers give clothing, food, and often information about the location and activities of the Turkish security forces. Because they are under armed and outnumbered, the PKK conducts ambushes and raids rather than direct confrontation against the Turkish forces. In 1999, the Turkish government captured Abdullah Ocalan, the rebel leader and icon. In addition, a government policy of korucu, impressing Kurds to guard Kurdish villages and thus fight their own people, compounds the presence of Turkish security forces in the southeast region. By contrast to the PKK, the MLIF, the strongest and most important separatist organization in the Philippines, is loosely structured and rather unorganized with internal factions squabbling with one another (Yegar, 2002, p. 260). The Central Committee of the MLIF lacked control over the regional commands that operated somewhat independently pursuing personal or tribal interests. Because the ranks came and went, the estimates range from 5,000 to 30,000 at the highest point, but as government retribution increased, more young Muslims joined the mujahideen as a religious duty (Yegar, 2002, p. 270). In 2002, avoiding a combat role, the U.S. had 660 troops to train the 7000 Filipino soldiers battling Abu Sayyaf, the militants linked to the Al-Quida network (Brown, Jan. 2002). In the Philippines, the civilian and military relationship varies from country to country, but in terms of the predominantly Muslim minority's area, the heavy military presence creates tensions. Sometimes the Muslims give wild guesses that the national military gives illegal arms to Muslim youth and then label them as terrorists. The negative perception of the military among the Muslim minority is obviously so high making more important the question, "How can the Manila government reduce the military presence in Mindanao, where there is no law and order in Mindanao?"

The Philippines' military also has inflicted many human rights abuses, organizing the disappearance of Muslims and conducting covert and illegal operations. I asked Professor Julabbi, the MILF/BMA representative, what his view on the military presence in southern Philippines was. He strongly opposed the military's presence and said that the "military is not a solution that worked in the past, it will not work now, and it will not put an end to the Bangasmoro struggle; it will continue." He added that as long as the injustice of the military continues, the same conflict will exist in the Philippines. Thus, the question remains: "Do we still need the armed forces as the protector of the country and the regime in a time of a pluralist democracy which is being operated by the political parties according to the will of the public?"

The question, "What conditions would allow the parties involved in ethnic conflict to settle their differences peacefully?" seeks alternatives to violence, options found in classical approaches to conflict theory. Explaining ways to achieve government stability despite nations' divisions by distinct ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural communities, Arand Lijphart (1977) sets forth his theories of consociation and of integration. The first, consociationalism, would help solve the problems in Mindanao, while the second, the integration approach, would help alleviate the great cleavage in Turkey.

Consociational systems allow for institutions that facilitate cooperation and compromise among elite political leaders, so that separate groups can coexist within a nation's borders. As an alternative, the integrative system seeks to give incentives for leaders to cooperate by granting the minority more influence in the majority's decision making. The following table shows that consociationalism relies on the elite's cooperation and guarantees to protect the interests of the minority through amicable agreements and that the integrative approach relies on incentives for cooperation on ethnic issues. Consociationalism is defined by a federal system with group representation while the integrative approach seeks a unitary one with coalitions (Lijphart 1977, p. 98).

Mechanisms Consociational Approach Integrative Approach

Territory Granting territorial autonomy;

creating confederal arrangements Creating mixed or nonethnic federal structure

Division of Power Creating polycommunal or ethnic

Federalism;

Assigning each group its own sphere of influence (territorially or functionally) Establishing an inclusive, centralized, unitary state

Decision-Making Rules Adopting group proportional representation in administrative appointments, including consensus decision rules in the executive;

"Depoliticisation" of the conflict, defining it as technical rather than ideological (Lijphart 1975). Adopting majoritarian but ethnically neutral or nonethnic executive, legislative, and administrative decision making bodies

Election System Adopting a highly proportional electoral system in a parliamentary framework Adopting a semi -majoritarian or a semi- proportional electoral system that encourages the formation of pre-election conditions (vote pooling) or coalitions across ethnic divides

State Acknowledging group rights or corporate (nonterritorial) federalism Devising ethnicity-blind policies

Ethnic Relations De-stabilizing effect of ethnic segmentation caused by overlapping cleavages (Lijphart 1969), a lack of mobility among social segments, or by strict group differentiation (Nordlinger 1972) Creating larger multi-ethnic parties with interests that transcend ethnic interests (economic or regional); crosscutting social cleavages resulting from ethnic identity and loyalties

Disadvantages Threatening for "elite cartel to turn democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy" (Lijphart 1969: 216). Fear of segmented autonomy and perhaps secession; elites vs. masses Becoming majoritarian, excluding minorities from political power

In terms of the territory, consociation would grant autonomy and create confederal arrangements in the Philippines, and the integrated approach would create a mixed, or nonethnic, federal structure in Turkey. Regarding the division of power, the consociational conflict-regulating practice would create a polycommunal or ethnic confederation in the Moros' southern region. For Turkey, the integrative conflict-regulating practice would establish an inclusive, centralized unitary state in the division of power including the Kurds. The decision making rules would differ under each approach with the Philippines adopting group proportional representation in administration appointments, including consensus decision rules in the executive branch and with Turkey adopting the majoritarian system but one ethnically neutral, or nonethnic, in executive, legislative and administrative decision-making bodies. For the structure of the state, the consocialitional approach would adopt a highly proportional electoral system in a parliamentary framework while the integrative approach would adopt a semimajoritarian or semi proportional electoral system that encourages the formation of pre-election coalitions (vote pooling) across ethnic divides. Finally, for the ethnic-related concerns, the consociational model would use federalism, and the integrative model would devise ethnically-blind public policies. Lijphart's classic study Democracy in Plural Societies (1977) outlines four necessary characteristics of consociational democracy: grand coalition, segmental autonomy, proportionality, and mutual veto. His theory of consensus democracy, a form of political engineering using ten institutional devices (such as a central bank or economic development) to broaden decision making, applies more to a "divided" or "semi-plural" society than to a deeply divided or plural one like the Philippines, which requires "the stronger medicine" requiring broad power sharing (Lijphart 1989).

An advocate of the integrative approach, Donald Horowitz proposes five mechanisms to reduce ethnic conflict: dispersion of the territorial powers, devolution power to encourage local intra-ethnic competition, electoral laws to encourage pre-election coalitions through vote pooling, policies to encourage alternative social alignments, and reduction of disparities between groups through a managed distribution of resources (1981, p. 165). More recently, using Lijphart's divisions, Timothy D. Sisk (1996) presents the theory of "complex power sharing," encompassing both consociational and integrative approaches. Both of the earlier approaches assume that a stable, multi-ethnic state is possible with the right strategies of accommodation. Noting that both approaches promote inclusive government coalitions, Ted Gurr argues that "used in creative and appropriate combination, the policies associate with regional autonomy, assimilation, pluralism and power-sharing could transform potentially destructive conflicts into more positive ones" (1995). Because ethnic conflicts result from complex variables, a sophisticated and flexible strategy would address the various demands of multi-ethnic societies, the specific institutions to attend to the segmented society, and the degree of autonomy (territorial or personal) requested. Thus, complex power sharing may address both the ethnic conflict in the Philippines and in Turkey because of its provision for different institutions to manage the conflict.